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The major purpose of the present study was to compare the causal attributions
made by Cooperators and Defectors for a cooperative and a noncooperative
target in an N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma. Factor analyses of attributions yielded
two factors associated with the target's intrapersonal processes. One intraper-
sonal factor was a combination of weakness and lack of intelligence, labeled
Ignorance, and the second was related to good versus bad, labeled Concern for
Others. Among Cooperators, noncooperation was attributed more than coop-
eration to Ignorance. Defectors did just the opposite. This supports the idea that
one's own predisposition prescribes criteria for rational choice in Prisoner's
Dilemma. Both Cooperators and Defectors attributed cooperation more than
noncooperation to Concern for Others. However, Cooperators made the largest
discriminations on this factor. The above findings were observed in three N-
Person Prisoner's Dilemmas varying in the extent to which Fear and Greed could
be the cause of noncooperation. In addition to Ignorance and Concern for Others,
factor analyses revealed two factors associated with the situational pressures of
Fear and Greed in the payoff matrix itself. The different dilemmas appeared to
affect both Cooperators' and Defectors' attributions to Fear and Greed in a
manner consistent with their underlying game theoretical differences. © 1990
Academie Press, Ine.
We are indebted to Henk Kiers and Wichard Zwaal for their assistance during the
experiment. Correspondence and reprint requests should be addressed to Paul van Lange,
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most thoroughly studied forms of social interdependence
is the Prisoner's Dilemma, which Kahan (1974) describes as arising from
two conflicting definitions of rationality, one individualistic and the other
collective (see also Colman, 1982; Hamburger, 1979; Pruitt and Kimmel,
1977). Individual rationality prescribes noncooperation; irrespective of
others' behavior, the defecting (D) or noncooperative choice leads to
individual outcomes equal to or higher than the cooperative (C) choice
(Luce and Raiffa, 1957). Collective rationality prescribes cooperation;
collective cooperative behavior pays off more to each person than col-
lective noncooperation.
For the past 30 years, experimental social psychology has devoted
much attention to the determinants of cooperation and noncooperation
in the 2-person (PDG) and N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma (NPD) (for
reviews see Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Pruitt & Kimmel,
1977). In the present study we attempted to extend previous research
by focusing on cognitive processes associated with choices in NPDs.
The primary purpose was to compare Cooperators' and Defectors' causal
attributions for the cooperative and noncooperative choices of others.
These attributions were examined in three different NPDs varying in the
extent to which Fear and Greed could motivate noncooperation. The
purpose of studying different NPDs was twofoid. First, it allows for a
determination of the generality of our findings. Second, we were inter-
ested in examining whether the causal analyses of naive subjects cor-
respond to the game theoretical differences underlying these dilemmas.
Causal attributions were examined by a procedure developed by Wimer
and Kelley (1982). In this procedure, the subject was asked to write a
paragraph providing the most probabie cause for a target person's choice.
Once written, the subject was asked to indicate how much they agree
with a series of statements that describe the self-generated paragraph.
Our statements were selected in an effort to examine two types of at-
tribution: (a) those associated with intrapersonal processes of the target
and (b) those associated with external, objective features of the dilemma
itself. Intrapersonally, we focused on attributions associated with the
rationality (or intelligence), potency (or strength), and morality of the
target. For the external processes we attempted to capture attributions
related to Fear and Greed.
Intrapersonal Bases for Attribution in NPDs
Rationality. In Prisoner's Dilemma each person is faced with two
choices, each simultaneously rational and irrational, or wise and foolish
(cf. Kahan, 1974). From the individualistic perspective the noncooper-
ative choice should be considered as intelligent and the cooperative
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choice as unintelligent, while the opposite holds for a collective
viewpoint.
If one accepts the idea that a perceiver's own goal or predisposition
affects his/her choice and also indicates the perspective (Collective or
Individualistic) taken on rationality, it follows that attributions to intel-
ligence should be determined by the combination of the target's choice
and the subject's own choice. Cooperators are likely to take the collective
view and to attribute Cooperation more than Noncooperation to intel-
ligence. Conversely, Defectors are likely to take an individualistic per-
spective and to attribute Noncooperation more than Cooperation to
intelligence.
Morality and potency. We anticipated two additional attributions as-
sociated with intrapersonal processes of the target, namely, attributions
to goodness/badness, or Morality, and to weakness/strength, or Potency
(cf. Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). The importance of morality
and potency as two different interpretations of interdependent behavior
has been demonstrated by Kelley et al. (1970) and Liebrand, Jansen,
Rijken, and Suhre (1986). Both studies indicate that cooperation is seen
as more moral, but as less potent than noncooperation. For attributions
it was expected that a cooperative choice would be attributed more to
the target's morality and that noncooperation would be seen as a con-
sequence of potency.
Further, we expected that Cooperators and Defectors would differ in
the degree to which morality and potency are judged as causes of co-
operative and noncooperative choice. This was based on the "Might
over Morality" effect observed by Liebrand et al. (1986). They showed
that the connotative meaning of cooperation and noncooperation is more
involved with morality among Cooperative judges and with potency
among Noncooperative ones. Extending this effect to attributions, it
follows that the subject's own choice should moderate these causal anal-
yses, with Cooperators emphasizing the morality difference more than
Defectors and Defectors emphasizing the potency difference between a
cooperative and noncooperative target more than Cooperators.
Properties of the Dilemma: Fear and Greed as Situational Bases for
Attribution of a Noncooperative Target
In addition to the intrapersonal process described above, causal anal-
ysis of choice behavior may be driven by features of the specific dilemma
payoff structure. In the present study we manipulated payoffs to produce
three different dilemmas that vary in the extent to which Fear and Greed
could be a cause of noncooperation. Fear is the aversive pressure cor-
responding to the locs avoided by noncooperation when the others do
not cooperate, and Greed is the appetitive pressure corresponding to the
profit one enjoys by noncooperating when others do cooperate (Coombs,
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1973; Rapoport, 1967). In one dilemma, the only pressure for noncoop-
eration was Greed, in another only Fear, and in the third both Fear and
Greed.
These three dilemmas allow us to see if naive subjects' causal analyses
of choice are sensitive to the formal game theoretical mechanisms de-
scribed above. If naive subjects understand the games in the same way
as game theorists, then attributions of Noncooperation to Fear (and
Greed) should increase proportionally with the level of Fear (Greed) in
the payoff structure.
Finally, the three NPDs enabie us to examine whether subjects them-
selves are more likely to noncooperate out of Greed than out of Fear,
as observed by Komorita, Sweeney, and Kravitz (1980) and Simmons,
Dawes, and Orbell (1984), or the opposite, as observed by Wyer (1969)
and Yamagishi and Sato (1986).
METHOD
Subjects
Seventy-six female and 74 male Dutch subjects were recruited through an advertisement
in a university paper. The average age of the subjects was 22.5 years, ranging from 14 to
37.
Design
The main design consisted of two between-subjects and one within-subject factor, labeled
"Own Choice" (Cooperator/Defector), "Game Type" (Fear Only, Greed Only, Fear and
Greed), and "Target Person" (Cooperative/Noncooperative), respectively.
Procedure
The subjects were individually invited to the laboratory, where they participated in
groups of five. Six persons were invited to each session to minimize the possibility of
fewer than five attending. In every session five or six subjects showed up.
The subjects were seated at five different tables arranged to prevent observation of each
others' response sheets; communication between subjects was prohibited. Before the study
began each subject was told that the amount of money earned would be determined by
their own and others' decisions during the experiment. The subject's first task was the N-
Person Prisoner's Dilemma in which each subject chose between cooperation and non-
cooperation. This initial task was the basis for classifying subjects as Cooperators and
Defectors. Next, subjects provided causal explanations for the choices of two targets, one
of whom had chosen cooperatively and the other noncooperatively.
The N-Person Prisoner's Dilemmas: Fear and Greed, Greed Only, and
Fear Only
For the first task, individual subjects were randomly assigned to one of three NPD
games, each corresponding to one level of a between-subjects variable: (a) Fear and Greed
(FG) (b) Greed Only (GO), and (c) Fear Only (FO). In these games, Greed was opera-
tionalized in terms of the profit gained by not cooperating when all others cooperate. Fear
was operationalized in terms of the loss avoided by noncooperating when the others are
universally noncooperative. The different payoff structures for the three games are shown
in Table 1.
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TABLE 1
THE PAYOFF STRUCTURES IN THE FEAR AND GREED, THE FEAR ONLY, AND
GREED ONLY NPDs
Fear and
Greed	 Fear Only	 Greed Only




<4 7.5 15 7.5 15 15 15
=4 22.5 30 22.5 22.5 22.5 30
In each game every subject was given an initial stake of 15 Dutch guilders (Dfl. 15 was
about $6) and told that their first task would be to choose between contributing or not
contributing half this stake (Dfl. 7.50) to a common pool. In all three dilemmas, contribution
and noncontribution corresponded to cooperation and noncooperation, respectively. Next
the specific payoff structure of each game was explained.
Instructions for the Fear and Greed game emphasized two features of its payoff structure.
First, to establish Greed, each subject was shown that it was possible to profit from not
contributing when all others contributed. Specifically, if all four others contributed, the
subject would receive a bonus of Dfl. 15 regardless of subject's own choice. As can be
seen from Table 1, the total outcome for not contributing was Dfl. 30 (the initial Dfl. 15
plus the Dfl. 15 bonus) and the total outcome for contributing was only Dfl. 22.5 (the initial
Dfl. 15 minus the Dfl. 7.5 contribution plus the bonus of Dfl. 15). Thus, given universal
cooperation in others, noncooperation was more profitable than cooperation by Dfl. 7.5.
To establish Fear it was pointed out that if the others were NOT universally cooperative,
no bonus would be provided. In this no-bonus case, the subject could not profit beyond
the initial Dfl. 15 stake. The total outcomes for not contributing and for contributing were
Dfl. 15 and Dfl. 7.5, respectively. Thus, the choice to contribute would cost the subject
Dfl. 7.5 and the loss could be prevented by not contributing.
In the Greed Only game, Fear was absent. This was accomplished by stating that if
others' cooperation was not unanimous, the subject's contribution would be returned if
one had been made. Therefore if the four others were not universally cooperative, co-
operation would NOT be more costly than noncooperation: the total outcome for both
cooperation and noncooperation was Dfl. 15 (see Table 1). As in the FG game, Greed was
established by providing a Dfl. 15 bonus to the subject if all four others cooperated. In
this case, noncooperation (total payoff = Dfl. 30) was Dfl. 7.5 more profitable than co-
operation (total payoff = Dfl. 22.5) (see Table 1).
Finally, in the Fear Only Game, Greed was absent. This was accomplished by stating
that the size of the bonus produced by others' universal cooperation would depend on the
subject's own choice: the bonus would be Dfl. 7.5 if the subject chose not to contribute,
and Dfl. 15 otherwise. Thus, given universal cooperation by others, noncooperation and
cooperation produced the same final outcome of Dfl. 22.5 (see Table 1). Fear was established
by making the subject's contribution nonreturnable when the others were not universally
cooperative and also by providing no bonus. Thus, noncooperation (total payoff = Dfl.
15) was DfJ. 7.5 less costly than cooperation (see Table 1).
Following the explanation of the game, a quiz was administered to check for compre-
hension. If the subject answered fewer than 4 of the 5 questions correctly, the game was
explained again. Throughout the instructions and the quiz no suggestions were given as
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to contribute or not. Once the subjects understood the task, each was asked to make two
responses. First, to indicate the number of other group members (from 0 to 4) they expected
to contribute. Second, to make a choice between contributing or not contributing Dfl. 7.5
of the initial stake to the common pool.
Causal Attributions for Cooperative and Noncooperative Behavior
Following the NPD task, but before receiving feedback about the number of cooperative
others, each subject was asked to make causal interpretations of cooperative and non-
cooperative choices performed by two imaginary targets. The order of target person was
determined randomly for each subject.
The attribution task was based on the method of Wimer and Kelley (1982). The subject
was asked to imagine a person, who in the ". . choice situation like the one you were
just in, did (cooperative target)/did not (noncooperative target) contribute 7.5 guilders."
Each subject was next asked to write in their own words the most probable cause for this
behavior.
Once the explanatory phrase had been written, the subject was asked to rate it on a set
of 80 items. Ratings were made on a 5-point scale, ranging from disagree (1) to agree (5).
The list of items contained all 44 used by Wimer and Kelley (1982) inciuding seven items
observed to measure good vs bad, an example being: "The reason makes good things
happen." In addition to the Wimer and Kelley items, an additional 36 were created for
this study. To examine attributions associated with rationality, we inciuded five items
reflecting (Lack of) Intelligence ("The reason indicates that the person does not know
better."). Fourteen items associated with Potency were inciuded ("The reason reflects a
self-assured personality."). As a social dilemma instance of good vs bad, six items were
intended to measure Concern for Others ("The reason makes a person be concerned for
others' interests."). Nine items were associated with the concept of Greed. For example,
"The reason makes a person want to win." Finally, nine more were associated with Fear
("The reason makes a person want to avoid losing."). Henceforth, we will refer to items
intended to assess each of these factors as a priori items.
After performing the Wimer and Kelley task for each target the subjects received real
feedback about the number of cooperative others in their group and were paid. The
attribution data of six subjects were exciuded because of missing values.
Construction of Causal Attribution Scales
The causal attributions to each target were first analyzed separately by means of principal
components analyses (PCAs) in order to determine the attributional dimensions used in
each case. Next, the resulting factors from each analysis were rotated to maximum sim-
ilarity (Ten Berge, 1977) and the results of this rotation were used as the basis for the
construction of attributional scales employed as dependent variables in analysis of variance.
PCAs of the Noncooperative Target and Cooperative Target
The PCA of the 80 items for the noncooperative target yielded 23 factors with eigenvalues
greater than 1. A scree plot (Cattell, 1966) of the eigenvalues suggested that no more than
four factors should be retained for rotation. Varimax rotation yielded four factors, each
with a distinct and anticipated interpretation. Items with absolute loadings greater than
.50 were used as the basis for each factor's interpretation.
The first factor (eigenvalue, 9.66) appeared to be a combination of potency (5 of the 14
a priori potency items) and intelligence (4 of 5 items) and was labeled Ignorance. Factor
2 (eigenvalue, 7.88) reflected Greed, containing 6 of the 9 a priori Greed items. Factor 3
(eigenvalue 5.74) was labeled Fear since it contained 8 of the 9 a priori Fear items. The
final factor (eigenvalue, 4.10) reflected a Concern for Others: it contained 3 of the 6 items
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intended to measure Concern for Others and two items intended to measure good–bad.
A separate PCA on the 80 items for the cooperative target yielded similar results. Varimax
rotation of the four-factor solution produced factors similar to those obtained for the
noncooperative target. Factor 1 (eigenvalue, 9.70) represented Ignorance, factor 2 (eigen-
value, 6.90) represented Concern for Others, and factor 4 represented Fear (eigenvalue,
3.75). Factor 3 (eigenvalue, 6.07) appeared to be a combination of Greed and Potency
items.
Comparison of the Factor Structures
To assess the stability of the attributional factors across both targets, the four-factor
solutions for each target were systematically compared. Comparison was made using a
computer program (Rotations of Unequal Matrices (RUM), (Brokken, 1981) which simul-
taneously rotates the factor loading matrices being compared so as to maximize their
similarity according to the inproduct criterion (Ten Berge, 1977). Mutual and simultaneous
rotation of both factor structures avoids the problem of arbitrarily choosing one solution
to serve as a standard. Postrotation Tucker's coefficients were fairly high: for Ignorance,
Greed, Fear, and Concern for Others the resulting coefficients were .90, .71, .82, and .73,
respectively. We conclude that across the two targets these four factors are similar.
The Scales for Ignorance, Concern for Others, Fear, and Greed
Using the maximally similar loading matrices, we constructed four internally consistent
(by Cronbach's a) scales as measures of Ignorance, Concern for Others, Fear, and Greed.
The scales of Ignorance and Concern for Others were constructed by selecting only those
items with high (absolute loadings higher than .50) and similar loadings on the same factor
across both target persons. The construction of the Fear and Greed scales was based upon
the initial nine items. For the Greed scale two of the initial items were excluded to obtain
a satisfactory internal consistency for the attributions to both cooperative and noncoop-
erative behavior. Table 2 presents the scales for Ignorance (six items), Concern for Others
(five items), Greed (seven items), and Fear (nine items), as well as Cronbach's a for each.
For each subject, two scores were computed on each of these four scales: one for each
of the two target persons.'
RESULTS
Attributions as a Function of Own Choice, Game Type, and Target
Using the four scales just described as dependent measures, a MAN-
OVA was conducted in which Own Choice (C or D) and Game Type
(FG, FO, GO) constituted the between-subjects factors and Target (C
or D) constituted the within-subjects factor. This analysis revealed three
significant multivariate main effects: (a) for Own Choice, F(4, 135) =
2.56, p < .05, (b) for Game Type, F(8, 270) = 2.42, p < .05, and (c)
Two discriminant function analyses in which we used all 80 items further supported
the importance of Ignorance and Concern for Others as attributional dimensions along
which Cooperators and Defectors differ. Discriminant analysis on attributions of coop-
eration showed that all items in the Ignorance scale significantly differentiated Cooperators
from Defectors. None of the items in the Concern for Others scale significantly differ-
entiated the two groups. A discriminant analysis on attributions of noncooperation showed
that all items in both the Ignorance and the Concern for Others scales differentiated the
two groups.
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TABLE 2






The reason indicates that the person:
did not think about it
is aware of what she/he is doing*
does not know better
is not aware of his/her influence over others
the reason indicates the person's ciumsiness
has limited intellectual capacities
Concern for Others	 .87	 .76
The reason indicates that the person:
wants to give chances to others as well
is concerned about others' interest
feels oneself responsible for others
wants to give something to others
wants to share profits in a fair way
	
.75	 .84Fear
The reason indicates that the person:
feels insecure
wants to take no risks
wants to avoid something terrible
does not want to be controlled by coincidences
experiences fear
wants to know what she/he is up to
does not have much confidence in other people
is afraid of being exploited by others
does not want to be the sucker
Greed	 .74	 .86
The reason indicates that the person:
always wants to win
has an urge to possess
wants to earn as much as possible
wants to earn more than a reasonable outcome
has a high need to achieve
prefers to get as much as possible
wants to get more than others
Note. Only one item (with asterisk) was reversed in the scale construction.
for Target, F(4, 135) = 9.83, p < .001. In addition, two first-order
interactions were detected: for Own Choice by Target, F(4, 135) = 18.59,
p < .001, and for Game Type by Target, F(8, 270) = 11.30, p < .001.
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All remaining multivariate effects were nonsignificant, using an a level
of .05.2
Below we examine the effects on each of the attributional dimensions.
Attributions to Ignorance
Target exerted a significant main effect, F(1, 138) = 3.91, p < .05.
Noncooperation was attributed more than cooperation to Ignorance (Ms
= 2.04 and 1.76, respectively). More importantly, attributions to Igno-
rance were affected by a strong interaction between Own Choice and
Target, F(1, 138) = 65.28, p < .001. Cooperators and Defectors disagreed
as to which behavior is most due to Ignorance. As can be seen from
Fig. 1, Defectors attributed cooperation (M = 2.19) more than non-
cooperation (M = 1.63) to Ignorance, whereas Cooperators attributed
noncooperation (M = 2.31) more than cooperation (M = 1.45) to
Ignorance.
Attributions to Concern for Others
As with Ignorance, there was a strong main effect for Target, F(1,
138) = 341.85, p < .001, and an interaction between Own Choice and
Target, F(1, 138) = 7.31, p < .01. Both Cooperators and Defectors
agreed that cooperation more than noncooperation should be attributed
to Concern for Others. Consistent with the findings of Liebrand et al.
(1986), Cooperators made a larger distinction between cooperative and
noncooperative targets (Ms = 3.60 and 1.41, respectively) than did De-
fectors (Ms = 3.40 and 1.89). Figure 2 presents the means associated
with this interaction. Tests for simple main effects associated with Own
Choice revealed that the difference between Cooperators' and Defectors'
attributions of cooperation to Concern for Others was not significant,
F(1, 142) = .98, n.s., while attributions of noncooperation did differ,
F(1, 142) = 27.72, p < .001.
Attributions to Concern for Others were also affected by the interaction
between Target and Game Type, F(2, 138) = 6.17, p < .005. As can be
seen from Tabie 3, it appears that as the relative amount of Greed in
the game decreased (i.e., highest in GO, next most in FG, and least in
FO) noncooperation was attributed to decreasing Concern for Others,
F(2, 141) = 7.32, p < .001. Over this same ordering of games, cooperation
was attributed to increasing Concern for Others, F(2, 141) = 2.61, p <
.08. This interaction shows that our naive subjects were sensitive to the
formal properties of the different games. The results presented next are
further demonstrations of such sensitivity.
2 A previous 2 (Own Choice) by 3 (Game Type) by 2 (Target's Choice) by 2 (Sex) showed



















FIG. 1. Causal attributions to Ignorance as a function of own choice (Cooperators and
Defectors) and target's choice (cooperative and noncooperative).
Attributions to Fear and Greed
The main effect for Target affected both types of attribution: (a) for
Fear, F(1, 138) = 77.89, p < .01, and (b) for Greed, F(1, 138) = 55.71,
p < .001. Noncooperation was attributed more to Fear (M = 2.89) and
Greed (M = 3.19) than cooperation (M = 2.08 and M = 2.44, respec-
tively). In addition, we observed a main effect on Greed for Own Choice,
F(1, 138) = 7.10, p < .01. Defectors attributed behavior less to Greed
than Cooperators (Ms = 2.65 and 2.94, respectively). We also obtained
a main effect for Game Type on Fear, F(2, 138) = 4.75, p < .05. Behavior
was attributed most to Fear in the FO game (M = 2.65), next most in
the FG game (M = 2.47), and least in the GO game (M = 2.34).
COOP	NONCOOP
TARGET
FIG. 2. Causal attributions to Concern for Others as a function of own choice (Co-
operators and Defectors) and target's choice (cooperative and noncooperative).
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TABLE 3
MEANS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TARGET PERSON BY GAME TYPE INTERACTION FOR THE
ATTRIBUTIONAL MEASURES OF FEAR, GREED, AND CONCERN FOR OTHERS
Target person
Game type
Attribution toFG GO FO
Noncooperative 3.00 2.35 3.34
Fear
Cooperative 1.94 2.32 1.96
Noncooperative 3.22 3.82 2.52
Greed
Cooperative 2.31 2.13 2.89
Noncooperative 1.62 1.36 1.81 Concern
for
Cooperative 3.52 3.75 3.28 Others
More importantly, we found a Game Type by Target interaction for
both Fear, F(2, 138) = 14.81, p < .001, and Greed, F(2, 138) = 36.48,
p < .001. The means associated with this interaction are presented in
Tabie 3. Attributions to Fear correspond to the relative amount of Fear
in the games. Tests for simple main effects indicated that noncooperation
was attributed to Fear most in the FO game, next most in the FG game,
and least in the GO game, F(2, 141) = 17.83, p < .001. A similar result
was obtained for Greed. Noncooperation was attributed to Greed most
in the GO game, next most in the FG game, and least in the FO game,
F(2, 141) = 23.57, p < .001. Since Fear and Greed presumably motivate
noncooperation, the attributions to noncooperation are straightforward
demonstrations of the correspondence between subjects' causal analyses
and features of the games.
Although less straightforward, the attributions of cooperative behavior
to Fear and Greed are of some interest. Tests for simple main effects
indicated that cooperation was attributed most to Fear in the GO game,
F(2, 141) = 5.13, p < .01, and most to Greed in the FO game, F(2, 141)
= 14.73, p < .001. These unexpected findings may indicate that subjects
were using a sort of psycho-logic: "The only reason that the target might
have been noncooperative was Greed (Fear). The target was, in fact,
cooperative. Therefore, Greed (Fear) was not motivating the target's
choice. So, what the target did do must be a result of Fear (Greed)."
Choice Behavior and Expectations in the Three Games
Prior to the attribution task, subjects chose between contributing and
not contributing to the common pool. Their cooperation levels varied
over the three NPD,s from 50 to 56 to 72% in the FG, FO, and GO games
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respectively. Although no significant overall effect occurred, X2(2) =
5.36, p < .10, resuts of 1-dfcomparisons between pairs of games indicated
that Fear inhibited cooperation more than Greed: (a) FG did not differ
from FO, X2(1) = 0.36, n.s., but (b) FG did produce more noncooperation
than GO, X2(1) = 5.09, dj' = 1, p < .05. The sex of subject exerted no
main or interactive effects in any of these analyses.
In addition, we examined the relationship between choice and expec-
tation as a function of Game Type. Using expectations (i.e., how many
of the four others were expected to cooperate) as the dependent mea-
sure, 3 a 2 (Own Choice) by 3 (Game Type) ANOVA revealed a highly
significant main effect for Own Choice, F(1, 142) = 111.06, p < .001,
and a significant interaction between Own Choice and Game Type, F(2,
142) = 6.10, p < .005. It appeared that Cooperators (M = 3.51) expected
more others to choose cooperatively than did Defectors (M = 1.98) and
that the expectational differences between Cooperators and Defectors
were significantly greater in the FO game (Ms = 3.77 and 1.59) than in
either the FG (Ms = 3.57 and 2.28) or the GO game (Ms = 3.32 and
2.24).
DISCUSSION
The major purpose of the present study was to compare the causal
analyses of cooperation and noncooperation made by Cooperators and
Defectors. The most important finding was that Cooperators' and De-
fectors' attributions to Ignorance were diametrically opposed. Cooper-
ators attributed noncooperation more than cooperation to Ignorance,
whereas Defectors did the opposite. In addition, they also differed in
the extent to which they discriminated cooperation and noncooperation
in terms of attributions to Concern for Others.
Ignorance
The Ignorance construct was a fusion of items associated with lack
of intelligence, or personal shortcomings in the thinking necessary to
make good decisions on the one hand and personal weakness/ineptitude
on the other. The different attributional use of Ignorance by Cooperators
and Defectors suggests that one's predisposition to cooperate or defect
covaries with two very different perspectives on rationality, described
by Kahan (1974) as collective and individualistic.
Similar to the Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) argument that
one's own choice in N-Person dilemmas determines expectations of oth-
ers' behavior, we suggest that one's behavioral predisposition prescribes
the perspective on rational behavior in NPDs. Specifically, if a subject
is predisposed to choose noncooperatively (cooperatively), the discovery
3 Expectation data of two subjects were exciuded because of missing values.
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of a dominated strategy consistent with one's goals becomes a compelling
and eminently rational force toward choosing the strategy. Further, since
both Defectors and Cooperators assume many others behave as they do
themselves, it is easy to imagine that a target who forgoes "the" rational
strategy is not only seen as rather uncommon, but allo as quite unin-
telligent or at least as someone who did not think enough before acting.
The implication of this "goal prescribes rationality" explanation is that
Defectors' attributions to Ignorance reflect individual irrationality,
whereas among Cooperators it is collective irrationality.
Concern for Others
Both Cooperators and Defectors appear to agree that cooperation more
than noncooperation flows from Concern for Others. Consistent with the
findings of Liebrand et al. (1986), however, Cooperators made larger
discriminations in their attributions to Concern for Others than did De-
fectors. This result was mainly due to Cooperators' and Defectors' at-
tributions of noncooperation.
That Defectors saw noncooperation as more morally determined than
Cooperators leads to a very interesting question for future research. To
what degree do different types of people include concern with their own
welfare in their definition of moral behavior? While most people would
agree that morality includes a sense of obligation to one's conspecifics,
there may be important differences in the way they see their moral
obligations to themselves. The present findings suggest that Defectors
more than Cooperators include obligation to their own welfare as a part
of their moral system.
Fear and Greed
In addition to Concern for Others and Ignorance, subjects made at-
tributions to constructs directly related to the game structural differences
between the dilemmas, namely, Fear and Greed. Across the three NPDs,
noncooperation rather than cooperation was seen as caused by high levels
of Fear and/or Greed. In addition, attributions of noncooperation to Fear
(and Greed) were directly proportional to the relative amount of Fear
(Greed) in the payoff structure. These findings are important because
they indicate that naive participants were capabie of analyzing NPDs in
terms of game theoretic considerations. Although the Prisoner's Dilemma
paradigm may appear somewhat abstract in its elementary representation
(cf. Nemeth, 1972), it elicits from naive participants a verbal understand-
ing that matches game theoretical principles underlying these dilemmas.
Finally, of the two structural variables (Fear and Greed) manipulated
here, Fear exerted at least as much influence on choice behavior as
Greed. In addition, we observed that the relationship between own choice
and expected cooperation of others was strongest in the FO game where
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the amount of Greed was low. This is, at least in part, consistent with
the findings of Yamagishi and Sato (1986) where the choice–expectation
relationship was found to be weakest in a situation where the amount
of Greed was high and Fear was low. These results together suggest that
expected cooperation, or trust, may mediate the extent to which Fear
and Greed are activated. Further, given the different empirical results
concerning the relative importance of Fear and Greed, it seems plausibie
that superficially minor situational differences may have a profound im-
pact on the activation of, and hence the relative importance of, Fear
and Greed (see also Yamagishi and Sato, 1986).
All in all, the present study provides clear evidence for the idea that
cognitive processes are strongly interrelated with choices in situations
of interdependence and that, in addition to greed, fear or the lack of
trust may play an important and unique role. From these results, one
might speculate that for people predisposed to defect, the dilemma may
be to make either a rational (noncooperative) or a moral (cooperative)
choice, while for people predisposed to choose the conditional cooper-
ative alternative, there should be less of a dilemma in terms of rationality
and morality, at least when they have sufficient trust in others'
cooperation.
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